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Introduction
The importance of Hume and Kant in the history
of the discussion about relations between the
sphere of facts (“Is”) and the sphere of duties
(“Ought”) cannot be overestimated. In point of
fact, it can be said that they initiated this discus-
sion by formulating the problem explicitly. They
also provided two “paradigmatic” answers to the
question of the relations between “Is” and
“Ought”, which determined the course of further
discussions: generally speaking, both Hume and
Kant agreed that there is no legitimate logical
transition between “Is” an “Ought,” but while
Hume (on one interpretation) believed that
“Ought” can be reduced to “Is,” Kant strongly
objected to this kind of reduction, stressing the
autonomy and irreducibility of the sphere of
“Ought.” But this general account of their views
simpliﬁes a lot. We shall try to highlight the com-
plexity of their investigations in the following
sections.
Hume
The issue of the mutual relation of “Is” and
“Ought” is tackled by Hume in the last paragraph
of the ﬁrst section of the Book 3 (“Of Morals”) of
his A Treatise of Human Nature. It comes as
follows:
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an
observation, which may, perhaps, be found of
some importance. In every system of morality,
which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time
in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes
the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am
surpriz’d to ﬁnd, that instead of the usual copula-
tions of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or
an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is,
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought,
or ought not, expresses some new relation or afﬁr-
mation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and
explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it. But as
authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall
presume to recommend it to the reader; and am
perswaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert
all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see,
that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded
merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d
by reason (Hume 2000: 302).
The above paragraph, often referred to as the
Is–Ought Paragraph (IsOP), is one of the most
frequently cited and, at the same time, the most
controversial passage from Treatise. There is a
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great controversy between Hume’s interpreters,
concerning not only what Hume exactly has in
mind under vague notions of “is” or “is not” and
“ought” or “ought not” but also what it means that
his “attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar sys-
tems of morality” and what “systems of morality”
he is concerned with at all. The signiﬁcance of the
closing line of the IsOP (“the distinction of vice
and virtue is not founded merely on the relations
of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason”) is also not
clear.
One can distinguish two approaches to the
interpretation of the IsOP – the textual one and
the contextual one. In general, the textual inter-
pretations are based on the literal reading of the
cited passage, whereas the contextual ones tend to
bear in mind the historical background of Hume’s
work, as well as his overall epistemology and the
psychology of morals. The textual interpretation,
sometimes referred to as the standard interpreta-
tion, was the dominant interpretation of the IsOP
for the most part of the twentieth century, although
in recent years, as a result of an intensiﬁed interest
in Hume’s overall moral theory, the contextual
interpretation is often considered as the more
accurate one. The division between these two
approaches should not be treated as the deﬁnitive
one – it should be considered as the typology
instead. Each researcher may be classiﬁed as
textualist or contextualist due to features domi-
nant in her reading of the IsOP. The distinctive
features of both approaches are introduced below.
According to the standard, textual interpreta-
tion in its most popular variation, Hume in the
IsOP formulates some putative thesis of logic that
one cannot deduce (derive) nonfactual (e.g., nor-
mative) conclusion from factual premises, the the-
sis which relies on the rules of the valid syllogism.
That thesis is sometimes referred to as “Hume’s
Law” or “Hume’s Guillotine.” There are two basic
versions of the textual interpretation of the IsOP –
the strong and the weak. The former is adopted by,
among others, R.M. Hare or P.H. Nowell Smith
and the latter by such scholars as Ch. Pidgen,
J. Searle, or A.N. Prior. According to the strong
textual interpretation, Hume’s Law creates “an
unbridgeable logical gap between ‘Ought’ and
‘Is’” (Black 1964: 169). Therefore, Hume’s argu-
mentation literally “subverts all the vulgar sys-
tems of morality,” i.e., systems of morality that
try to bridge that unbridgeable gap. According to
the most radical readings, the conclusion of the
IsOP is that it is entirely impossible to build any
ethical system at all. Readings like that often go
hand in hand with the noncognitivist view of
moral judgment – the view that moral judgments
do not express any beliefs or state any facts but,
rather, express speaker’s emotions, which means
that they cannot be truth-evaluable. Weak
textualists claim, on the other hand, that the
above conclusions are too far-reaching. They
agree that there is the “unbridgeable logical gap
between ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’” – but they also stress
that the gap is merely logical and that one can
actually get “moral conclusions from non-moral
premises by logic plus [some] analytic bridge
principles” (Pidgen 2011) or by means of logic
plus some “constitutive rules of the institution” –
which are the rules “that give the word ‘promise’
its meaning” (Searle 1964: 57–58). This reading
of the IsOP may be more proper but, as some
scholars point out, also makes it quite trivial.
There is also a group of interpreters who claim
that in the cited passage, Hume simply recom-
mends a profound caution in the course of deriv-
ing normative conclusions from factual premises.
Hume’s Guillotine, according to them, undercuts
these “vulgar systems of morality” whose authors
do not think and argue clearly enough.
Other interpreters – the more contextual ones –
try to read the IsOP against the background of
Hume’s critique of the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century ethical rationalism, which he
undertakes in the Book 3 of Treatise (ﬁrst section
of which is entitled Moral Distinctions Not
Deriv’d From Reason – section, which ends up
with the IsOP). Rationalists, like W. Wollaston,
R. Cudworth, or S. Clarke, claimed that moral
laws exist objectively and can be recognized by
reasoning and their recognition intrinsically gives
us reason to act in accordance to them. Hume’s
moral theory, sentiment-based and anti-rationalist,
was in large part an attempt to rebut the rational-
ists’ doctrines. His argumentation, in broad
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outline, was as follows. The function of reason is,
generally speaking, discovering relations or the
matters of fact (Hume 2000: 14–15). We can’t
ﬁnd the basis for our moral distinctions among
relations or facts in the physical world (Hume
2000: 301). Moreover, even if such basis were to
be found, rationalist would have to demonstrate in
what way those relations or facts discoverable by
reasoning “wou’d be universally forcible and
obligatory” (Hume 2000: 300) or, using more
contemporary language, how they could give us
authoritative reasons for actions. That argumenta-
tion, additionally strengthened by the so-called
Representation Argument (Hume 2000: 295)
(according to which passions or volitions cannot
be contrary to reason because they are not repre-
sentations of any objects), entails that ethical
rationalists are wrong and that “the distinction of
vice and virtue is not founded merely on the
relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.”
However, the thesis that Hume’s main target in the
IsOP was ethical rationalists is not commonly
accepted. S. Botros, for example, claims that
Hume in the cited passage attacks not only ratio-
nalists but also other thinkers, such as his mentor,
sentimentalist S. Hutcheson (cf. Botros 2006:
72–95). Others, including A. MacIntyre, think
that Hume’s main antagonists are dominant reli-
gious beliefs of his times and his main aim was to
ground his naturalistic view of ethics (MacIntyre
1959: 451–468). As was in the case of the textual
interpretation, there are stronger and weaker con-
clusions, which may be entailed by the contextual
interpretation of the IsOP. The most radical inter-
preters claim that Hume’s aim is the absolute
“rejection of ‘Ought’ as a moral category”
(Capaldi 1966: 126–137). Less radical scholars,
rejecting such far-reaching conclusions, claim that
Hume rejects only metaphysical, external
“Ought” and simultaneously establishes internal,
human-dependent “Ought” (cf. Darwall 1995:
1–22; Korsgaard 1996: 49–89). Some others say
that Hume, in the IsOP, does none of the above.
According to that view, “Hume’s task in his moral
philosophy is completely analogous to his task in
epistemology: to explain how a common world is
created out of private and subjective elements”
(Haakonsen 1981: 4). Thus, Hume’s reasoning
does not “subvert vulgar systems of morality.”
Quite the opposite – the Scottish philosopher
tries to defend the common sense morality
(understood as the whole system of beliefs, not
as the set of particular moral beliefs) before he
attacks counterintuitive ethical theories. The com-
monsense morality would be subverted if ethical
rationalists were right. Since they are wrong, and
we put the sentimentalist view in their place, we
can still rely on common sense while building our
moral systems. The contextual interpretation of
the IsOP is often accompanied by more
cognitivist views in metaethics (e.g., Cohon
2008: 96–125). But here there are also some
exceptions – J.L. Mackie, for example, interprets
Hume as ethical anti-realist (which is an non-
cognitivistic approach) and attributes to him the
view called “objectiﬁcation theory,” which is
compatible with his own ethical doctrine, ethical
falsiﬁcationism (Mackie 1980: 144).
Some people interpret the IsOP as the antici-
pation of the so-called naturalistic fallacy.
G.E. Moore famously claimed that naturalists
were guilty of what he called the “naturalistic
fallacy,” viz., the attempt to deﬁne ethical predi-
cates (such as good or right) in nonmoral terms.
This is, according to Moore, a “fallacy” because
no such deﬁnition can pass the test of the “open
question argument,” i.e., we can always reason-
ably ask whether what is supposed to be the deﬁn-
iens of the predicate “good” is really “good”; the
possibility of asking such a question attests, in
Moore’s view, that all deﬁnitions of “good” are
mistaken (cf. Moore 1903: Chap. I). According to
some views, Hume, in the IsOP, formulates a
similar critique. Opponents of the view that
Hume’s intentions were similar to those of
Moore point out that Hume himself was a natu-
ralist who analyzed moral terms by reference to
various natural properties (such as agreeable or
useful to oneself or others, or eliciting approval in
the impartial spectator), and thereby it makes little
sense to connect him with the formulation of the
naturalistic fallacy. These opponents, however,
omit the possibility that Hume’s view may be
inconsistent: in the IsOP he may have anticipated
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the “naturalistic fallacy” but, at the same time,
may have also constructed normative ethic
which is based on precisely the same fallacy – of
identifying moral properties with some natural
properties.
Kant
As was shown above, given Hume’s moral theory,
within which “Ought” appears to be deﬁned in
factual terms, one may doubt whether he really
makes a clear distinction between “Is” and
“Ought.” In Kant’s moral philosophy, by contrast,
facts and duties are kept very strictly distinct. The
differences between Kant and Hume in this con-
text can be stated more precisely in the following
way:
1. As was mentioned in section “Hume,” com-
mentators of Hume’s works are in disagree-
ment as to whether he admitted “Ought” at
all. What can be said for sure is that if there is
a place for “Ought” in his moral philosophy,
this can be only weak, internal “Ought.” Thus,
if Hume introduces any normativity (“Ought”)
at all, he locates it at the level of facts. Kant, by
contrast, unambiguously separates the sphere
of facts from the sphere of duties, believing
that they are to be situated at metaphysically
different levels which are irreducible to each
other. He therefore explicitly introduces
“Ought” in the strong, external sense, believ-
ing that it can be defended only if the separate
sphere of normativity (as distinguished from
the sphere of facts) is postulated.
2. Kant agrees with Hume (at least if we assume
the standard, textual interpretation of the lat-
ter’s views) that one cannot “deduce” any nor-
mative truth from the factual truths, but the
way of apprehending normative truths is con-
ceived by both philosophers in entirely differ-
ent ways: for Kant moral truths are synthetic a
priori judgments, i.e., judgments which are
formulated without recourse to sense experi-
ence and whose truthfulness is not determined
by the meaning of its component terms – thus
they can be known by reason; for Hume, by
contrast, they are either factual truths (on the
cognitivist interpretation of his theory) or have
no truth value (on the noncognitivist interpre-
tation of his theory).
These two points of Kant’s moral theory – i.e.,
the strict separation of the realm of facts and the
realm of duties and the claim that it is thanks to
reason that we know the truths belonging to the
sphere of duties – are, of course, strictly
connected. Let us now analyze them in somewhat
greater detail, starting from the basic epistemolog-
ical point concerning the role of reason in moral
cognition. Then we will pass to some more
detailed questions.
Unlike Hume, who assigned a purely instru-
mental role to reason in the sphere of action (the
role of ﬁnding appropriate means for realizing
ends determined by “passions”), Kant’s central
point, formulated in direct polemic with Hume,
is that reason has also a practical (moral) dimen-
sion: that is, its role consists in guiding the course
of human action in the fundamental sense of dis-
covering or constituting an unconditional rule of
conduct, viz., the categorical imperative, which
human beings (or, more generally, all rational
agents) ought to follow. This belief is deeply
embedded in his philosophy with its central
claim about the active role of reason in constitut-
ing our cognition, but, interestingly, Kant formu-
lates also a strictly empirical argument for it: he
asserts that the function of reason consists in pro-
ducing a goodwill in human beings (i.e., a will
whose motive is the obedience to the categorical
imperative) rather than in securing their preserva-
tion, since “in a being which has reason and a will,
if the proper object of nature were its conserva-
tion, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then
nature would have hit upon a very bad arrange-
ment in selecting the reason of a creature to carry
out this purpose” (Kant 1964: 12). To return to the
categorical imperative, the imperative discovered
or constituted by reason is categorical in the sense
of being unconditioned by the previously existing
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ends or desires of the agent. In other words, it
formulates a duty which is binding for all rational
agents, irrespective of whether following this duty
is in accordance with their preexisting desires or
ends. The exact content of this rule (in its basic
formula called “universal law”) is as follows: “Act
only on that maxim through which you can at the
same will that it should become a universal law”
(Kant 1964: 51) (it is usually assumed that Kant
proposed ﬁve various formulations of the categor-
ical imperative, which he believed to be equiva-
lent. Arguably the most famous, apart from the
Formula of the Universal Law, is the Formula of
the End in Itself, according to which one ought to
act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in
one’s own person or in any other person, always at
the same time as an end, never merely as a means).
As mentioned before, Kant believes that the cate-
gorical imperative is an a priori synthetic judg-
ment and, consequently, that the requirement that
maxims (personal principles) of human conduct
must be such that agents can will them to become
a universal law is not part of the deﬁnition of the
concept of moral action (even though, in his view,
moral action does consist in fulﬁlling such a
requirement). Kant also strongly emphasizes that
one needs not engage in deep philosophical think-
ing in order to understand that the categorical
imperative is a cornerstone of (proper) morality;
he claims that this supreme principle of morality is
presupposed or “encoded” in the common man’s
awareness of duty; the only merit of the philoso-
pher (Kant himself) is to bring to light, i.e., for-
mulate explicitly, what is understood implicitly by
every common man. He also distinguishes
between the categorical imperative and
a categorical imperative (or categorical impera-
tives). The categorical imperative (in its various
formulations) is the supreme principle of morality
which enables testing various maxims of actions
as to whether they are moral; a maxim that passes
this test becomes a categorical imperative. One
can therefore say that the sphere of “Ought” (or,
more precisely, of “moral Ought”) consists of the
categorical imperative (in its various formula-
tions) and a broad (potentially inﬁnite) set of
categorical imperatives. How this sphere is
exactly known and what ontological status it has
are controversial points of Kant’s moral philoso-
phy that we shall deal with in the remainder of this
section.
From what has been said above, it follows that
Kant emphasized a strict relation between ratio-
nality and morality. In fact, on his view, morality
becomes a part of rationality: reason, acting in the
practical sphere, points at the rules of moral
actions. However, the question arises (we have
left this question open in the initial description
of Kant’s theory) how exactly reason “points at”
the rules of moral action: whether it discovers or
constitutes them. Kant does not decide this ques-
tion with full clarity, but it can hardly be doubted
that the second alternative (“constituting”) is more
consistent with his “transcendental” approach to
philosophical problems (within which the empha-
sis is laid upon the active role of reason in human
cognition), as well as with his insistence on the
fact that rational agents are “self-legislators” who
autonomously impose on themselves moral duties
(the claim that there are some binding moral
duties which exist in the sphere of “Ought” and
which are to be discovered and obeyed by rational
agents would be viewed by Kant as incompatible
with these agents’ autonomy and as an instance of
a “heteronomous” moral theory). Consequently,
one should say that, according to Kant, reason
does not discover the categorical imperative pur-
portedly preexisting in some mysterious sphere of
moral “Ought” but rather, by virtue of its own
activity, constitutes it (and thereby the sphere of
moral “Ought”). It may be noted in this context
that only on this interpretation Kant’s view of the
sphere of moral normativity can be regarded as
truly original: if Kant just claimed that reason
“discovers” preexisting moral truths, his view
would be in essential points similar to the view
of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ethical
rationalists (which, as was mentioned, were
strongly criticized by Hume).
Another interpretational problem of Kant’s
moral theory (related, as we shall see, to the prob-
lem of whether reason discovers or constitutes the
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categorical imperative) is connected with an
ambiguity in Kant’s works regarding the question
of whether the categorical imperative can be jus-
tiﬁed in the sense of being derivable from some
more fundamental principle (cf. Paton 1946:
203–205). On the one hand, in Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals, he seems to suggest
that the categorical imperative can be justiﬁed by
an independently established presupposition of
freedom. On the other hand, in Critique of Prac-
tical Reason, he conceives of the categorical
imperative as “a fact of pure reason” which we
know a priori as a certain truth; accordingly, it
need not (and cannot) be derived from anything
else and, furthermore, is itself a basis for
conducting a “deduction” of freedom as a neces-
sary presupposition (postulate) of moral judg-
ments, since in making a moral judgment of an
agent’s action we assume, in Kant’s view, that the
action was “freely chosen,” i.e., the agent could
have acted otherwise (as is well known, according
to Kant, the other presupposition of practical rea-
son are the immortality of soul and the existence
of God). Accordingly, in Kant’s view expressed in
Critique of Practical Reason, freedom is a pre-
supposition of making moral judgments but not a
principle from which the categorical imperative
can be derived, whereas in Groundwork he seems
to assign to freedom both roles. As can be easily
seen, Kant’s claim that the categorical imperative
is a “pure fact of reason,” not derivable from
anything else, provides another argument for
such an interpretation of his ethical view which
assumes that reason constitutes rather than dis-
covers moral truths. It is worth invoking in this
context the opinion of H.J. Paton: “Kant’s ethics is
not based on metaphysics: it would be truer to say
that his metaphysics, so as we take this to be
concerned with supersensible reality, is based pri-
marily on ethics. Whatever confusion or error
there may be on this topic in the Groundwork is
to a great extent cleared always by the Critic of
Practical Reason” (Paton 1946: 203–205). This
opinion is (generally) apt but it should be quali-
ﬁed. Truly, Kant’s metaphysics understood in this
strong sense (the existence of supersensible
reality: soul, God, freedom) is indeed based on
his ethics. But it should be noticed that his ethics is
metaphysical in some weaker sense, especially if
compared with an unambiguously naturalistic
ethics of Hume. Kant believes that reason (the
distinguishing capacity of all rational agents) con-
stitutes a sphere of moral “Ought” which is irre-
ducible to the sphere of facts; and even if he does
not confer a strongly metaphysical status on this
sphere (as existing independently of rational
agents), its status can nonetheless be regarded as
metaphysical, given the metaphysical status of the
very reason (as imposing necessarily true laws in
moral and physical sphere). One more remark
seems to be in order here. The fact that we regard
Kant’s ethics as metaphysical does not mean that
we agree with G.E. Moore that Kant’s ethics is
based on the naturalistic fallacy (in its wider
sense, embracing also the attempts to deﬁne ethi-
cal predicated in metaphysical, not only natural-
istic, terms). Moore (1903: Chap. IV) claimed that
Kant identiﬁes the predicate “good”with the pred-
icate “required by the rational will” or “required
by reason” and thereby commits the naturalistic
fallacy. But this interpretation of Kant’s moral
theory cannot be defended, since Kant, though
associating the categorical imperative with the
capacities of reason, does not make any deﬁni-
tional claim; he asserts that the categorical imper-
ative is known by reason (or, as we propose to
interpret his theory, the categorical imperative is
constituted by reason in the sense that in the
absence of reason, there would be no categorical
imperative); it is, as Kant strongly emphasizes, a
synthetic a priori judgment, whose truthfulness
cannot be derived from any other statements
(e.g., about reason or rational will).
Conclusion
As can be inferred from the above account of
Hume’s and Kant’s views on “Is” and “Ought,”
the interpretational problems they engender are of
a different kind –much more serious in the case of
Hume. Even though it is clear, at least for most of
6 “Is” and “Ought” in Hume’s and Kant’s Philosophy
his readers, that Hume did not believe that there
exists some form of reasoning that can justiﬁably
lead us from “Is” (statements about facts) to
“Ought” (statements about duties), one can plau-
sibly argue that Hume believed that reduction of
“Ought” to “Is” is feasible, i.e., that statements
about duties are in fact statements about facts
(about what is agreeable or useful to oneself or
other persons or what would be approved by the
impartial spectator). There seems to be an incon-
sistency in the claim that one cannot derive duties
of facts and that duties are reducible to facts;
however, this inconsistency could be eliminated
if Hume’s purportedly normative moral theory
was interpreted as a descriptive moral theory
(saying how people do in fact make moral judg-
ments). Perhaps this was Hume’s intention, but
this issue is hard to settle. The interpretational
problems of Kant’s theory are of a much less
serious nature. There is no controversy as to the
basic claims of Kant: he believes that “Ought”
cannot be either derived from “Is” or reduced to
it; that it constitutes a separate realm, radically
different from the realm of facts; and that it may
be known by means of reason. The crucial inter-
pretational problem of Kant’s moral theory con-
cerns the very relation between the sphere of
“Ought” and reason: whether reason constitutes
it or discovers it; and if reason constitutes it (what
seems to us to be a more plausible interpretation),
what speciﬁc implications this “constitution” has
for the question about the ontological status of the
sphere of “Ought” (it is clear that this account of
the sphere of “Ought” makes it metaphysical, but
it remains unclear what is the difference between
the strong, external “Ought” understood in the
Kantian way and the strong, external “Ought”
understood in the spirit of ethical rationalists).
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